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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE “MIXED” AND 
“DOUBLE” CONVENTION MODELS REGARDING 
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS  
YOAV OESTREICHER∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
On June 30, 2005, a new instrument regulating the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments was adopted at the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law and opened for countries to join.1 This new 
instrument, referred to herein as the “New Hague Convention,” was the 
culmination of thirteen years of extensive negotiations in which an 
ambitious attempt has been made to regulate, for the first time in history, 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in various fields of 
law by means of a comprehensive international convention.2 The result, 
however, was a limited convention so “skeletal” that it only regulates 
recognition and enforcement of judgments in which the jurisdiction of the 
rendering court was based on an “exclusive choice of court agreement”3 
between the parties. The New Hague Convention does not apply to forum 
selection agreements to which a consumer (defined as a natural person 
 
 
 ∗ Dr. Yoav Oestreicher is an Adjunct Professor of Law at Bar-Ilan and Haifa Universities in 
Israel; S.J.D., Duke University School of Law, Durham, North Carolina; LL.M., Tel-Aviv University 
Law School, Israel; LL.B., Bar-Ilan University Law School, Israel. Member of the New York, North 
Carolina and Israel Bars. I would like to thank Professors Jerome H. Reichman, James Boyle and Paul 
D. Carrington for helpful comments to my doctoral dissertation on which this Article is based. The 
views in this article are solely mine, and I remain responsible for any mistakes that may remain. E-
mail: yoestreicher@gmail.com. 
 1. The full text of the New Hague Convention is available at http://www.hcch.net/index_ 
en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98 (last visited July 18, 2007). 
 2. For more elaboration on the history of the New Hague Convention negotiations, see Ronald 
A. Brand, Intellectual Property, Electronic Commerce and the Preliminary Draft Hague Jurisdiction 
and Judgments Convention, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 581 (2001).  
 3. See New Hague Convention, art. 3. This term is defined as an agreement concluded by two or 
more parties that is concluded or documented in writing; or by any other means of communication 
which renders information accessible so as to be usable for subsequent reference; and designates, for 
the purpose of deciding disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal 
relationship, the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting 
State to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any other courts. A choice of court agreement which 
designates the courts of one Contracting State or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State 
shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have expressly provided otherwise.  
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acting primarily for personal, family or household purposes) is a party.4 
Even this instrument,5 despite being so narrow in scope, was not favorably 
accepted and drew substantial criticism from scholars and various interest 
groups around the world, primarily due to the fact that it applies to non-
negotiated contracts and does not exclude contracts to which small 
businesses and non-profit organizations are parties. Consequently, it 
should not be surprising if this instrument never comes into effect due to a 
lack of participating countries, similar to what occurred with the Hague 
Convention of February 1, 1971 on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters.6 
In this Article, I attempt to analyze the reasons for the colossal failure 
of the international community to agree on a single international 
comprehensive instrument that regulates recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments. I do so by concentrating on the intellectual property 
field of law as a model, as it traditionally impedes finalizing such a 
convention,7 and because there is no such thing as uniform intellectual 
property law that binds all countries (there is no such thing as an 
international patent, copyright or trademark).8 Though all parties to the 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement 
(hereinafter “TRIPs Agreement” or “TRIPs”)9 are required to adhere to 
minimum standards in terms of protecting minimum subject matter and 
 
 
 4. See New Hague Convention, art. 2. 
 5. The New Hague Convention does not apply to matters relating to “the validity of intellectual 
property rights other than copyright and related rights;” or to “infringement of intellectual property 
rights other than copyright and related rights,” except where infringement proceedings are brought for 
breach of a contract between the parties relating to such rights, or could have been brought for breach 
of that contract. Id. Other matters that are excluded from the scope of the New Hague Convention are, 
inter alia, the status and legal capacity of natural persons; maintenance obligations; wills and 
succession; insolvency, composition and analogous matters; marine pollution; antitrust (competition) 
matters and liability for nuclear damage. Id. 
 6. The 1971 Hague Convention never became effective because only three countries 
(Netherlands, Cyprus and Portugal) have ratified it. For the reasons that resulted in the failure of the 
1971 Hague Convention, see Yoav Oestreicher, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Intellectual 
Property Judgments: Analysis and Guidelines for a New International Convention 144–47 (North 
Carolina 2004), available at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/archive/00000700/ (last visited July 18, 2007).  
 7. I concentrate on intellectual property as these rights have always been considered to be 
territorial in nature. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, (National) Trademark Laws and the (Non-National) 
Domain Name System, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 495, 500 (2000). See also CHRISTOPHER WADLOW, 
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1998). 
 8. For discussion of the term territoriality, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The Cyberian Captivity of 
Copyright: Territoriality and Authors’ Rights in a Networked World, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 347 (1999). 
 9. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15, 1994, 
Marakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter “TRIPs Agreement”]. 
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providing minimum rights, many see intellectual property as “a bundle of 
national, territorially defined, rights.”10 
I conclude that the fundamental mistake that scholars have made 
throughout history is the unjustified continued attempt to base the 
convention on a “mixed”11 or “double”12 convention model, thus 
combining the question of recognition and enforcement with the 
substantially complicated question of jurisdiction. I argue that the inability 
to agree on the jurisdiction question resulted in the inability to regulate the 
recognition and enforcement issue, as the two questions were needlessly 
intertwined. It is evident that any past and future attempt to mix the two 
questions in one international instrument is doomed to failure and, unlike 
what has been done until now, should be avoided at all costs.  
Consequently, I propose a somewhat revolutionary solution to the 
problem in the sense that it is based on a “simple” convention13 model that 
promotes a “presumption of enforceability” rule with very broad 
exceptions, such as: public policy, due process of law, and jurisdiction. 
 
 
 10. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright: From a “Bundle” of National Copyright Laws to 
a Supranational Code, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 265, 266 (2000). 
 11. A mixed convention “specifies the authorised [sic] grounds of jurisdiction, the prohibited 
ones and in which all the other grounds, i.e. those falling neither within the category of authorized 
grounds nor within that of the prohibited grounds, are left as a matter for national law to decide 
freely.” Catherine Kessedjian, SYNTHESIS OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMISSION OF JUNE 1997 
ON INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL 
MATTERS 2 n.1 (Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document No. 8) 
(1997). The most important element in the mixed convention model is that the rendering court may 
assert bases of jurisdiction other than the mandatory ones provided for in the convention, which leaves 
it a greater amount of discretion. In other words, “[w]ith a mixed convention . . . States must always 
make the authorized grounds of jurisdiction available to the litigants, but they may retain other 
grounds of jurisdiction.” Id. See also CONSULTATION PAPER ON THE DRAFT HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL OR 
COMMERCIAL MATTERS 4 (International Law Division, Department of Justice Hong Kong) (1999) 
[hereinafter HAGUE CONSULTATION PAPER, HONG KONG], available at http://www.doj.gov.hk/eng/ 
archive/doc/4499.doc (last visited July 16, 2007). 
 12. “A double convention deals with both the question of direct jurisdiction and the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments. It thus responds to the question as to which court has 
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings and to that as to the effect of the judgment thus delivered.” 
Kessedjian, supra note 11, at 1. 
 13.  
A simple convention deals only with the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
and is therefore not concerned with matters of direct jurisdiction. In other words, it does not 
respond to the question as to when courts have jurisdiction in proceedings instituted for the 
first time. If a simple convention contains rules on jurisdiction, they are only rules on indirect 
jurisdiction. These are rules which, only a posteriori, at the stage of the recognition and 
enforcement of the judgment, serve to verify the jurisdiction of the court of origin in order to 
ascertain whether its decision may or may not be recognized or enforced in the State 
addressed. 
Id. 
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The proposed convention does not deal directly with the issue of 
jurisdiction, but rather addresses this issue indirectly as an exception to the 
general rule of enforcement. By creating the convention within the 
framework of TRIPs, I expect it to enjoy some of the elements that are 
already contained therein, including matters of due process, public policy, 
and international dispute settlement.  
It should be noted that if this new proposal is successfully adopted and 
implemented, it would bring stability and create confidence and trust 
among potential member countries, and could be expanded in scope to 
also apply to other fields of law, thus serving as the basis for a broader 
international solution.  
I. WHY PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS FAILED  
A solution to the problem of recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments may be found in the sphere of public international law.14 We 
can try to create an international treaty or convention signed by 
governments and countries that would provide a set of rules that regulate 
the ways in which a judgment rendered in one country can be recognized 
and enforced in another country. The current absence of such a convention 
makes things more complicated and creates a substantial hurdle to 
international commerce as the enforcing court has no guidance and is most 
likely to apply “the internal rules of the court in which enforcement is 
sought.”15  
There are several explanations that can be provided for the continuing 
failure to achieve the goal of creating an international convention for the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. I have previously 
reviewed most of the major past international and regional instruments and 
drafts that attempted to regulate this problem in order to better understand 
the reasons for their failure to resolve it.16  
One such explanation could be the mistrust and suspicion that exists 
between various countries and legal systems. This could be the result of 
 
 
 14. Another recognized potential solution to the problem is the signing of bilateral treaties 
between countries. However, this solution is far from perfect. For example, during the 1970s, the U.S. 
engaged in negotiations with the U.K. to create a bilateral treaty to recognize and enforce foreign 
judgments. This treaty was never signed due to pressure applied by the British insurance industry, 
which feared the enforcement in the U.K. of punitive damages awards rendered against them in the 
U.S. See Sean D. Murphy, Negotiation of Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments, 
95 AM. J. INT’L L. 387, 419 (2001).  
 15. WILLIAM D. PARK & STEPHEN J.H. CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 459 
(1990). 
 16. Oestreicher, supra note 6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/5
p 339 Oestreicher book pages.doc 10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 343 
 
 
 
 
not sharing the same ideas as to general concepts of justice, because of 
differences in public policies, or simply because they have different 
principles of due process of law. The problem with this somewhat 
psychological explanation is that it is not something that countries or 
governments acknowledge out loud. It is simply not politically correct. 
One country cannot declare that the legal system of another country is so 
mistrusted that its judgments cannot be recognized and enforced in its 
territory. For example, it is arguably much easier for an American court to 
enforce a judgment rendered by a British court, than it would be for such a 
court to enforce a judgment rendered by a religious court in Pakistan or 
Afghanistan, even if it addresses business disputes. Consequently, one can 
conclude that the fear of taking a broad international obligation to enforce 
judgments rendered by all foreign courts with limited discretion is a major 
obstacle to the adoption of such an instrument.  
A second and more important reason is that all these past instruments, 
to a certain extent, tried to combine the issues of recognition and 
enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction. These attempts were based on 
the notion of automatic enforcement of foreign judgments by the court 
addressed, subject to very limited exceptions, if the rendering court had 
legitimate jurisdiction based on a list of pre-approved bases of jurisdiction 
provided for in the same international instrument.17 Even the 
comprehensive attempt, at the Hague Conference concluded in 2004, to 
create an international convention based on a mixed convention model18 
(hereinafter the “2004 Hague Draft”) failed, as many believe, due to the 
use as a model of the European Community’s Brussels Convention on 
Jurisdiction and the Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters of September 27, 1968 (hereinafter the “Brussels Convention”),19 
which was drafted as a double convention.20 These proposals all required 
the potential members to agree on bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, 
 
 
 17. For analysis of past attempts to create an international instrument regulating the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments, see Oestreicher, supra note 16, at 125–79.  
 18. See Hague Conference on Private International Law, Summary of the Outcome of the 
Discussion in Commission II of the First Part of the Diplomatic Conference 6–20 June 2001, 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgm2001draft_e.pdf. See also Brand, supra note 2 (discussing the 
history of the 2004 Hague Draft). 
 19. 1968 O.J. (L 299) 32, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969) (as amended by the Convention on 
Accession of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 21 (1979)).  
 20. See Arthur T. Von Mehren, Drafting a Convention on International Jurisdiction and the 
Effects of Foreign Judgments Acceptable World-Wide: Can the Hague Conference Project Succeed?, 
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 191, 196–97 (2001). See also The Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters of September 16, 1988, O.J. (L 319) 1, 
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989) (signed by the Members of EFTA and the European Union) 
[hereinafter the “Lugano Convention”]. 
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something that the potential signatories and participants were not in a 
position to do. 
One commentator described the importance of the jurisdiction issue as 
follows: 
A claimant wants to be able to take action speedily, in a court close 
to him and whose rules are familiar to him, in order to protect the 
rights which he enjoys or thinks he ought to enjoy. As for the 
defendant, he does not want to have to defend the suit in a court far 
away from the centre of his personal or economic interests, and he 
wants the court dealing with the case to uphold his right to 
adversarial proceedings which respect to the fullest the right of 
defence. In our view, therefore, the issue is much more one of direct 
jurisdiction than of the recognition and enforcement of judgments.21 
The question of whether the rendering court has the right to assert 
jurisdiction in a specific case is considered by many to be the most 
fundamental factor in determining whether to recognize or enforce a 
foreign judgment.22 The thirteen years of negotiations at the Hague 
Conference have proven that an agreement on the jurisdiction issue will 
eliminate many of the obstacles involved in the creation of such a 
convention, but that such an agreement is very hard to reach.  
If one decides to pursue the enforcement of a judgment rendered in 
one’s favor in a foreign jurisdiction, or when a suit is filed for relief based 
on the ruling of a foreign court, one is faced with the problem that the 
court addressed is under no obligation to abide by the foreign 
jurisdiction’s ruling, and instead, is free to examine the merits of the case 
independently and refrain from acting on the foreign judgment.23 If a 
monetary judgment is involved, for example, the court which rendered the 
judgment will never be able to enforce its own judgment if the defendant 
has no assets within the territory over which the rendering court has 
jurisdiction. The court cannot order the seizure and selling of assets 
 
 
 21. Catherine Kessedjian, INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL 
AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS (Hague Conference on Private International Law, Preliminary Document 
No. 7) (1997). 
 22. In the Anglo-American legal systems, the decision by the enforcing court of whether to 
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment balances, to a great extent, on the question whether the 
rendering court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the case from an international perspective. See ARTHUR 
T. VON MEHREN & DONALD T. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS 836 (1965). See 
also Paul S. Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 324 (2002) (“[I]f a 
community asserts jurisdiction, it must—if it wants its judgment enforced—convince others of the 
justice of its ruling and the legitimacy of its assertion of community dominion.”). 
 23. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895). 
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located outside its jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying its judgment. 
Similarly, if equitable relief, such as an injunction, is involved, the 
rendering court is unable to order the enforcing authorities within its 
jurisdiction (e.g., the sheriff in the U.S. or the execution authority in other 
countries) to enforce the judgment if the assets, instruments or occurrences 
involved in the case are outside the jurisdiction. 
Consider the following example given by Professor Eugene Ulmer 
nearly thirty years ago. A French traveling theatre company goes on a tour 
in Belgium. It is performing a work subject to copyright protection in 
Belgium, but not in France. Clearly, a suit can be brought against the 
French entity in Belgium, but can a claim be brought in France for 
violation of Belgian copyrights in Belgium?24 
The most significant explanation to the lack of agreement on the 
jurisdiction issue is that the potentially participating countries have 
different political, economical, social and cultural objectives that pull them 
in different directions and prevent them from reaching common ground.25  
There are significant differences in interests among countries with 
respect to the protection of intellectual property rights26 and, consequently, 
with respect to foreign judgments enforcing such rights. For example, 
during the negotiations of the TRIPs Agreement, disagreements arose 
between different groups of countries that shared contradicting interests 
and views regarding the protection of intellectual property rights.27 
Developed countries such as the U.S., Japan and members of the European 
Union supported a more protectionist approach, as they are the main 
producers of intellectual property rights, especially with respect to 
patents.28 Significant parts of their economies are based on the creation, 
utilization, and export of inventions protected by intellectual property 
 
 
 24. Eugen Ulmer, Intellectual Property Rights and the Conflict of Laws: A Study Carried Out for 
the Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for International Market and the 
Conflict of Laws 15 (1978). 
 25. See id. at 200. See also Arthur T. Von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of 
Foreign Adjudication: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1603 (1968). See 
also Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 22, at 834.  
 26. Jonathan A. Franklin & Roberta J. Morris, International Jurisdiction and Enforcement of 
Judgments in the Era of Global Networks: Irrelevance of, Goals for, and Comments on the Current 
Proposals, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1213, 1244 (2002). 
 27. For the history of the negotiations of the TRIPs Agreement, see MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE 
RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 123 (1996).  
 28. See A.O. Adede, The Political Economy of the TRIPs Agreement: Origins and History of 
Negotiations 3–4, available at http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/2001-07-30/Adede.pdf) (last visited July 
16, 2007). 
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rights.29 Their greatest fear was the possibility that many of the inventions 
protected in their territories, which involve significant monetary and 
technological investments, would be copied, reproduced, and sold in other 
countries where less emphasis is put on protection measures, thus resulting 
in significant monetary losses.30 In addition, they feared that such 
unauthorized and uncompensated utilization of the inventions would 
reduce the incentive for new developments, since no benefits would result 
from these inventions if they were easily copied and widely distributed.31 
On the other side stood the developing countries that engage in the 
development of technology, but would benefit from weaker levels of 
intellectual property protection.32  
The TRIPs Agreement attempts to balance and provide several 
arrangements to satisfy the needs of the developing and least developed 
countries, while still attempting to protect the rights and interests of the 
developed countries. For example, the least developed countries were 
granted a grace period of ten years to adjust their legal systems and laws to 
the requirements of minimum standards set forth in the TRIPs 
Agreement.33 Similarly, Articles 65(2) and (4) allowed the developing 
countries a grace period of four and five years respectively to comply with 
their obligations, under certain conditions. Another solution under TRIPs 
was that governments were awarded the option to grant compulsory 
licenses to use and manufacture foreign patents in certain unique 
situations.34 
The same problem of contradicting interests in the protection of 
intellectual property rights arises with respect to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments. Courts are reluctant to recognize or 
enforce foreign judgments if they contradict the enforcing jurisdiction’s 
interests.35 By doing so, these countries risk that their own judgments will 
not be recognized or enforced abroad. Other countries, on the other hand, 
 
 
 29. Id. at 4. 
 30. Id. at 6. 
 31. See generally Frederick M. Abbott, Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: 
Negotiations in the GATT Multinational Framework, 22 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 689 (1989) 
(discussing the economics of intellectual property in the international sphere).  
 32. See Adede, supra note 28, at 6. 
 33. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 6. This broad exception does not include 
compliance with Articles 3 and 4 which address the issues of National Treatment and Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment.  
 34. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, at 31. 
 35. For example, Sweden and the Netherlands seem to refrain from enforcing foreign judgments 
if no treaty is available. SYMEON SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, 
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 860 (St. Paul 1998).  
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rely on the idea of reciprocity to solve this problem.36 This is based on the 
belief that the fear that their own judgments will not be enforced or 
recognized abroad will deter such countries from not enforcing foreign 
judgments at home. One major problem with this argument is that those 
countries that are likely to refuse to recognize or enforce foreign 
judgments are many times the same countries that have less advanced 
intellectual property capabilities and provide lower levels of protection 
(i.e., developing countries). These countries may not be afraid that foreign 
courts will not enforce their judgments as a penalty or retaliation, because 
they do not always have such technologies to protect. From an economic 
perspective, the gain that they may generate as a result of not enforcing 
foreign judgments that protect advanced foreign technologies is far greater 
than any loss that they may suffer if their judgments are not enforced 
abroad in retaliation. 
The pattern of the TRIPs negotiations is repeated here. The fact that 
different countries have contradicting interests and agendas leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that it will be very difficult to reach common 
ground. This makes it difficult for them to agree on a single instrument to 
regulate the jurisdiction issue. Therefore, in order to create such an 
instrument, a way needs to be found to overcome these differences in 
interests. This process has already started in the drafting of the TRIPs 
Agreement. 
It should be noted that the only international instrument that did not try 
to combine the issue of enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction was the 
1971 Hague Convention, which was also the only one to ever reach the 
advanced stage of ratification. Even though this instrument ultimately 
failed, we can be encouraged by the fact that its failure can be attributed to 
unrelated reasons, such as its complex structure that required member 
countries to negotiate bilateral instruments in addition to their signing of 
the convention.37 
To a certain extent, the differences in interest problem may ironically 
be the very reason and explanation for the relative success of the Brussels 
and Lugano Conventions, which relate to participants who, at least in 
recent years, pursued a similar agenda and social, political, cultural and 
economic interests.38 These two instruments, which are regional 
 
 
 36. See generally Hilton v. Guyot, supra note 23 (discussing the reciprocity requirement in U.S. 
jurisprudence).  
 37. See Oestreicher, supra note 6, at 144–47. 
 38. The Treaty Establishing the European Community, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, signed in Rome on 
March 25, 1957, included, in Article 220, a requirement that Member States of the European 
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conventions applicable to the European continent, were relative successes 
despite the fact that they were drafted as a double convention since the 
signatories share substantially similar interests and were thus motivated to 
participate.39  
Despite the extensive negotiations which took place in previous years 
to reach an agreement regarding bases of jurisdiction for issues of 
intellectual property rights, no such understanding has ever been reached. 
An agreement will probably not be reached in the near future since the 
interests and the gaps involved are simply too wide. As one U.S. 
government official put it: “The group is finding it difficult to draft rules 
even in a limited number of areas,”40 not to mention a more 
comprehensive instrument. Therefore, the solution should probably be 
sought in another direction. This means that we will need to find a way to 
somehow circumvent the jurisdiction problem to avoid antagonism on the 
part of potential members of such an international instrument.  
The term jurisdiction is very broad when used with respect to 
intellectual property rights. It can include jurisdiction to adjudicate 
infringement of the rights; adjudication of claims regarding the registration 
of the rights41 or their validity or cancellation;42 or jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the misuse of a license granted to use the intellectual property 
rights and similar claims. In practice, from an international perspective, 
the most compelling issue is the jurisdiction to adjudicate infringement of 
intellectual property rights,43 mainly because this is the most controversial.  
 
 
Community engage in further negotiations “with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals 
. . . the simplification of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of 
judgments of courts or tribunals and of arbitration awards.” 
 39. For general discussion of conflict of laws in Europe, see DOMINIK LASOK & PETER STONE, 
CONFLICT OF LAWS—EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY COUNTRIES (1987); see also REIMANN 
MATHIAS, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE: A GUIDE THROUGH THE JUNGLE (1995). 
 40. William New, E-Commerce: International Negotiators Divided On Online Contract 
Disputes, NAT’L J. TECH. DAILY (Mar. 10, 2003), available at http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ 
hague-jur-commercial-law/2003-March/000774.html (last visited July 18, 2007). 
 41. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, art. 16(3).  
 42. See, e.g., Brussels Convention, art. 22(4), which provides that:  
in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trademarks, designs, or 
other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, the courts of the Member State in 
which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is under the terms of 
a Community instrument or an international convention deemed to have taken place [shall 
have exclusive jurisdiction]. 
 43. See, e.g., Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal, art. 6.  
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II. THE BASICS OF A POSSIBLE SOLUTION 
As indicated above, the common ground for the failure of previous 
attempts to internationally regulate the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments is the fact that they all, to some extent, tried to combine 
the issues of recognition and enforcement with the issue of jurisdiction. In 
other words, these were all “double convention”-oriented instruments. 
Even the 2004 Hague Draft attempt to create a mixed convention failed 
due to the use of the Brussels double convention as a model.44 This 
attempt ignored the economic, political, cultural and social background 
differences among the negotiating parties, and some view that as the 
reason this attempt to create an international instrument that regulates the 
issue was unsuccessful.45 Put differently, “[t]he Special Commission in its 
work premised a higher degree of consensus among the Hague Conference 
Members than existed and ignored the full implication of the fundamental 
differences in the economic, political, and institutional situation that made 
the Brussels and Lugano Conventions workable, and the global setting of a 
Hague Convention.”46 In sum, the debate in the world today among 
scholars is not about recognition and enforcement, but rather about the 
bases of jurisdiction. 
Consequently, finding a solution to the recognition and enforcement 
problem requires the participating countries to make concessions and to 
compromise on some of the issues about which they have very strong 
feelings. It requires them to be attentive to the needs of others, and to be 
secure in the knowledge that others will be attentive to their needs. This 
will not be easy because, as one commentator has put it, “[b]etter the devil 
we know—and have learned to live with—than the devil we know not.”47 
The following proposal for the creation of an international instrument 
regulating recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is less 
ambitious in many respects than all recent attempts to create such an 
instrument. However, this may be the very reason why it has a better 
prospect of gaining approval and support from many countries. 
 
 
 44. See Von Mehren, supra note 20, at 196. 
 45. See id. at 199. 
 46. Id. at 200. 
 47. Id. at 201. 
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A. Basic Assumption—Bases of Jurisdiction Will Not Work 
History has proven that the “double” and “mixed” convention 
structures are likely to succeed only in situations where the participating 
countries share the same views as well as the same political, social, 
cultural and economic interests. The need for a list of bases for the 
assertion of jurisdiction, and determination in advance of which court will 
be entitled to adjudicate each case, requires the participating countries to 
have substantial confidence in each other. This can be usually found in 
bilateral or regional agreements, and is lacking in the broad international 
sphere. It is not surprising then that the Brussels and Lugano Conventions 
were relative successes. At the point which the European countries 
negotiated these instruments, they shared a joint view of a united Europe 
and their political, social and economic interests were relatively close to 
each other. Thus there was a real incentive for and interest in the 
successful implementation of these new conventions. Even if they did not 
necessarily agree on everything, they sometimes agreed to swallow the 
bitter pill for the sake of ultimately enjoying the benefits of belonging to 
this union of countries.48 The gain that they expected from joining the 
union compensated them for the concessions they had to make and for the 
fear and risks involved. To some extent, the relative success of these two 
instruments is similar to the success of the “sister states’” recognition and 
enforcement system in the U.S., which is based on the Full Faith and 
Credit clause of the United States Constitution. This system requires each 
U.S. state to give “Full Faith and Credit . . . to the . . . Judicial Proceedings 
of every other state.”49 Both are based on the broader commitment that 
these members have towards one another.  
It is therefore not surprising that during the thirteen years of 
negotiations resulting in the 2004 Hague Draft, the proponents of a double 
 
 
 48. The Treaty Establishing the European Community, signed in Rome on March 25, 1957, 
included in Article 2202 a requirement that Member states of the European Community engage in 
further negotiations “. . . with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals . . . the simplification 
of formalities governing the reciprocal recognition and enforcement of judgments of courts or tribunals 
and of arbitration awards.” 298 U.N.T.S. 11. The purpose of such an arrangement was to enable the 
players in the European Community to take full advantage of the opportunities that exist as a result of 
such economical cooperation, by providing them with legal protection upon which they can rely 
should they decide to engage in economic activities. See Olivia Struyven, Exorbitant Jurisdiction in 
the Brussels Convention 5, available at http//:www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/jura/35n4/struyven.htm (last 
visited July 16, 2007). It intended to encourage “free movement of judgments within the European 
Community, in the same way that there is to be free movement of labour, services, goods, etc.” 
WILLIAM D. PARK & STEPHEN JH. CROMIE, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL LITIGATION 3 (1990). 
 49. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/5
p 339 Oestreicher book pages.doc 10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 351 
 
 
 
 
convention were the European countries.50 Only in a later stage, a few 
days before the official publication of the first draft of this convention, 
was it decided to revise the document and turn it into a “mixed” 
convention. The reason for this sudden change was the fear that an 
instrument structured as a “double” convention would never be signed 
because of the limited discretion available to the participating countries to 
assert jurisdiction in certain situations.51 Independent countries do not like 
the idea of possible interference with their sovereignty, and require the 
option to decide for themselves how to react to each given situation. The 
hope was that the mixed convention structure would make it easier for 
them to accept the limitations on their discretion by providing them with 
more latitude than that of a double convention.52 The American 
delegation, which pressured the delegates to agree to a mixed convention, 
argued that, for constitutional reasons, it could not participate in a double 
convention.53 
In a perfect world, where everyone shares the same interests and 
follows the same agenda, the double convention model would have been 
the ultimate solution, because it provides certainty and an element of 
predictability that are so important in the business world. However, we do 
not live in a perfect world and there are many conflicting interests—
economic, cultural and political—that make it very difficult for different 
countries to reach a mutual understanding as to the way judgments should 
be internationally recognized and enforced. In light of the above, there 
currently seem to be no prospects in continuing to explore the option of a 
double convention based instrument to solve this problem.  
A different model is required to address this issue—one that would 
circumvent or eliminate the lack of agreement on the issue of jurisdiction 
lying at the base of the continuing failure of the double and mixed 
 
 
 50. HAGUE CONSULTATION PAPER HONG KONG, supra note 11, at 4.  
 51. In fact, the Preliminary Hague Draft was essentially drafted as a double convention and only 
four days before the closing of its fourth session, the Special Commission accepted the format of a 
mixed convention:  
The Special Commission in its work premised a higher degree of consensus among the Hague 
Conference Members than existed and ignored the full implication of the fundamental 
differences in the economic, political, and institutional situation that made the Brussels and 
Lugano Conventions workable, and the global setting of a Hague Convention. 
 Von Mehren, supra note 20, at 199–200. 
 52. See Peter Nygh & Fausto Pocar, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND 
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS 28 (Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Preliminary Document No. 11) (2000), available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/ 
wop/jdgmpd11.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007). 
 53. HAGUE CONSULTATION PAPER HONG KONG, supra note 11, at 4. 
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convention models. Therefore, the proposed solution must attempt to 
resolve the problem despite the differences in opinions, agendas and 
interests, and try to steer clear of the minefield of the jurisdiction issue. 
This and every other proposal will fail to achieve its goals if a sincere 
attempt by the participating countries to resolve the differences is not 
made. This is mainly about politics and personal agendas, and if the 
participating countries decide not to cooperate due to their own personal 
reasons, nothing can force them to go all the way. We can provide the 
solution, but we cannot force them to adopt and implement it. 
B. A Simple Convention Model as a Possible Solution 
An alternative solution to the recognition and enforcement problem is 
the creation of an instrument based on the simple convention model, 
which only regulates the recognition and enforcement issues and avoids 
doing so with respect to jurisdiction. 
One of the most important elements in entering into an international 
business transaction is predictability and the ability to know and determine 
in advance where the litigation would take place in cases of disputes 
between the parties (i.e., certainty). Knowing which court will assert 
jurisdiction in cases of disputes will make it easier for the participating 
parties to calculate the risks involved in entering into the transaction. Even 
though the solution of a simple convention may be less attractive than that 
of a double or mixed convention because it provides less predictability and 
certainty, it is still a good solution, at least in the short run. A simple 
convention is especially appealing in light of the fact that the chances of 
reaching an agreement based on these two other models are slim, if not 
non-existent. A simple convention will make it easier for the parties to join 
the proposed international instrument, as it would eliminate the need to 
agree in advance on the bases for the assertion of jurisdiction. The 
potential participants will not feel as if other nations are interfering with 
their sovereignty and will feel more comfortable taking the risk of entering 
into this “adventure.” 
Most importantly, such a proposed convention creates an international 
obligation to recognize and enforce foreign intellectual property judgments 
and that commitment also includes a moral obligation. 
One example of a successfully implemented simple convention is the 
Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign 
Judgments and Arbitral Awards signed in Montevideo on May 8, 1979 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol6/iss2/5
p 339 Oestreicher book pages.doc 10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
2007] RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 353 
 
 
 
 
(hereinafter the “Montevideo Convention”).54 This convention was ratified 
and is now in force in nine countries.55 The Montevideo Convention 
ensures the extraterritorial validity of judgments and arbitral awards in the 
Member countries.56 It applies substantially “to judgments and arbitral 
awards rendered in civil, commercial or labor proceedings in one of the 
States Parties,”57 subject to certain reservations they can make. The 
instrument contains a set of conditions that, if met, gives the judgment 
extraterritorial effect in all the member countries. Most pertinent is the fact 
that the Montevideo Convention does not regulate the issue of jurisdiction. 
The only reference to jurisdiction can be found in Article 2, which requires 
the enforcing court as a condition for enforcement of the foreign judgment 
to verify that the rendering judge or tribunal was competent “in the 
international sphere” to provide the judgment “in accordance with the law 
of the State in which the judgment . . . is to take effect” and any debate 
regarding the potential bases for the assertion of jurisdiction is absent.  
A development took place in 1984 that may provide us with an 
indication about the superiority of the simple convention model. In that 
year there was an attempt to complement the Montevideo Convention with 
a new convention that attempted to regulate the issue of indirect 
jurisdiction. This was the Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in 
the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign 
Judgments signed at La Paz, Bolivia on May 24, 1984 (the “La Paz 
Convention”).58 The purpose of the La Paz Convention was to 
complement the Montevideo Convention and provide a set of bases of 
jurisdiction that, if complied with, satisfied the jurisdiction requirement 
under Article 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention.59 The La Paz 
Convention was signed by thirteen countries, but was ratified at first only 
by Mexico (1987) and came into effect only twenty years after its adoption 
(in 2004) upon the ratification of Uruguay.60 In other words, once these 
 
 
 54. Inter-American Convention on Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments and Arbitral 
Awards, May 8, 1979, http://www.weil.com/wgm/cwgmhomep.nsf/ files/montevio/$file/montevio.pdf 
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention].  
 55. Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. 
at 5. 
 56. Montevideo Convention, supra note 54, pmbl.  
 57. Montevideo Convention, supra note 54, art. 1. 
 58. Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere for the Extraterritorial 
Validity of Foreign Judgments, May 24, 1984, http://www.oas.org/juridico/ english/sigs/b-50.html 
[hereinafter La Paz Convention]. 
 59. La Paz Convention, supra note 58, pmbl.  
 60. Id. Notably, both Mexico and Uruguay have declared, at the time of ratification, that they 
will apply this instrument to determine the validity of the competence in the international sphere 
referred to in Article 2(d) of the Montevideo Convention, without prejudice to their ability to order the 
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countries tried to replace the simple convention model with a double 
convention model that also regulated the issue of jurisdiction, the whole 
structure collapsed. 
The idea of not addressing the issues of jurisdiction should 
theoretically be relatively easy to accept for the U.S., which is expected to 
take an important role in any future negotiations of such an international 
recognition and enforcement convention. In fact, the Uniform Foreign 
Money-Judgments Recognition Act (hereinafter the “UFMJRA”),61 which 
was drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform 
State Laws and adopted by the American Bar Association in 1964, like a 
simple convention, does not provide bases for the assertion of jurisdiction 
of the rendering court as a prerequisite to the enforcement of foreign 
judgments. All it provides in Section 4 is that a judgment shall not be 
conclusive and thus available for recognition in the U.S. if the rendering 
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant, or if it did not 
have subject matter jurisdiction.62 In other words, like in a simple 
convention model, U.S. courts adopting this model act do not have to 
address the issues of jurisdiction as a prerequisite for enforcement, or limit 
themselves to a given set of bases of jurisdiction, very much like the 
proposal herein advanced.  
Before adopting an instrument based on the simple convention model, 
we must ask what we really accomplish by doing so. Do we really solve 
the jurisdiction problem by ignoring it? One of the main arguments in 
opposition of the simple convention idea is that it really does not solve 
anything, because the jurisdiction problem does not go away, and much 
uncertainty remains.63 In other words, refraining from including agreed 
upon bases of jurisdiction in the convention does not mean that the 
enforcing court can avoid looking into whether the rendering court was 
entitled to render the judgment. The court will still need to address this 
issue before recognizing or enforcing the foreign judgment, but will not 
have a convention to guide it. 
It should be noted that when the negotiations at the Hague Conference 
started in 1992, the idea of creating a simple convention was immediately 
turned down. Opponents of this proposal suggested that such an 
 
 
application of this Convention independently. 
 61. Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act (1963), Prefatory Note and Comments, 
available at http://brownwelsh.com/Archive/ufmjra62.pdf (last visited July 18, 2007) [hereinafter 
UFMJRA]. 
 62. See UFMJRA § 4. 
 63. “The idea of a single convention was discarded as it leaves too much uncertainty with regard 
to jurisdiction.” CONSULTATION PAPER HONG KONG, supra note 11, at 5.  
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instrument “would not be an improvement on the current situation and 
practice”64 (i.e., no convention at all). They argued that in the current legal 
situation each country could decide for itself whether it should assert 
jurisdiction and whether it should recognize or enforce a foreign judgment. 
Therefore, they argued, if we do not agree on the bases for the assertion of 
jurisdiction we do not really do anything new because each country can 
continue to do whatever it had done before.65 
This alleged justification for avoiding a simple convention solution is 
far from accurate. Even though such a convention will not provide a list of 
agreed upon bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, it will change and 
improve dramatically the current international regime as it will add a 
major international obligation and a moral commitment on the part of all 
of the participating countries to recognize and enforce foreign judgments, 
something that does not exist under the current regime and should not be 
underestimated. This is a major improvement on what we have today. 
Most countries recognize international law or at least pretend to make 
significant efforts to comply with their international obligations, either out 
of respect for other countries, to remain part of the international 
community, or in an attempt to maintain some global order.66 Even though 
the mechanisms that the international community can utilize to force its 
members to fulfill their international obligations are extremely limited, the 
very existence of such obligations embodies tremendous power. Even the 
stronger countries are very careful to comply with them. 
C. Presumption of Enforceability 
The basis for the idea of a simple convention is that a judgment is 
always recognized and enforced unless there is a good reason not to do so. 
This proposal includes a rebuttable legal presumption that every foreign 
judgment is entitled to recognition and enforcement—the “presumption of 
 
 
 64. EUROPA—JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS—RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, PUBLIC HEARINGS ON 
THE HAGUE CONFERENCE (Brussels, Oct. 24, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/ 
news/consulting_public/24102002/printer/news_hague_conference_en.htm (last visited July 18, 2007). 
 65. See Nygh & Pocar, supra note 52, at 28 (“The Special Commission has accepted the 
Working Group’s conclusion that a ‘single Convention’ would not be useful.”). 
 66. See General Elec. Co. v. Deutz Ag., 270 F.3d 144, 160 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that interests 
of comity precluded an injunction barring the German guarantor from appealing an arbitration panel’s 
ruling on the issue of arbitrability sitting in London and within the jurisdiction of an English court). 
See also Linkco, Inc. v. Nichimen Corp., 164 F. Supp. 2d 203, 214 (D. Mass. 2001) (“[The] central 
precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign tribunals should be given effect 
in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation and encourages reciprocity, 
thereby promoting predictability and stability through satisfaction of mutual expectations.”). 
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enforceability.” Under this rule, the court addressed will always 
automatically recognize and enforce the foreign judgment when asked to 
do so. Like other legal presumptions, the party against whom the judgment 
is recognized or enforced carries the burden of proving that there is a 
legitimate reason to refrain from doing so. Consequently, the party 
objecting to the recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment has to 
overcome this presumption. 
As discussed below, the TRIPs Agreement, which establishes the 
minimum standards tool, provides a wide enough legal basis to justify the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and the existence of a 
presumption of enforceability. The minimum standards requirement is 
broad enough to put all of the member countries of the TRIPs Agreement 
on similar footing that will guarantee that the laws of all member countries 
are substantially similar, so that it is easier for the participating countries 
to enforce the judgment even though the laws of the rendering and 
enforcing forums may not be identical. One must keep in mind that the 
basic assumption is that identity is not required for recognition or 
enforcement of judgments. In fact, if identity is required, the international 
rules guarding the enforcement process are substantially less necessary. 
It should be noted that the idea of such a presumption of enforceability 
may already be found in other legal systems. For example, the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments system in Germany established in Section 
328 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Zivilprozessordnung, or “ZPO”) 
provides a negative list of grounds for refusal of such recognition. In other 
words, it assumes the recognition of such judgments as a general rule.67 
Recognition does not take place for certain reasons, such as lack of 
jurisdiction, fault in service of process, obvious incompatibility with 
German legal principles, and the absence of any guarantee of reciprocity.68  
After the proposed convention is adopted, it is expected that case law 
interpreting the convention will emerge, creating additional jurisprudence. 
The new rules created by case law can later be utilized, codified and 
inserted into the convention through negotiations. 
For the presumption to arise, the party addressing the court or seeking 
recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment must only prove that 
the judgment is genuine. For that to happen, that party bears the burden of 
providing a true, correct, and authenticated copy of the judgment at issue. 
The purpose of this very simple rule, with which it is easy to comply, is to 
 
 
 67. See Fritz Blumer, Jurisdiction and Recognition in Transatlantic Patent Litigation, 9 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 329, 383 (2001). 
 68. See id. at 383–84. 
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make it as easy as possible for people to have favorable judgments 
recognized and enforced in foreign countries. Once this requirement has 
been fulfilled and the presumption established, the opposing party must 
prove that there is a legitimate reason for the court addressed to refuse the 
recognition or enforcement of the judgment.  
One may ask what is the source and legal basis for the creation of a 
presumption of enforceability. After all, this term does not appear in the 
relevant literature. The answer can be drawn from Article 41 of the TRIPs 
Agreement. The obligation to recognize and enforce foreign intellectual 
property judgments is not a new one. In fact, all of the TRIPs Member 
States acknowledged such an obligation when they signed the TRIPs 
Agreement in 1994. After all, “the principal motive forces for including 
intellectual property rights as a subject matter of the Uruguay round of the 
GATT was the perception that the existing international intellectual 
property regime lacked effective enforcement.”69 There is no logic in 
arguing that these efforts were intended to be limited to the provision of 
intellectual property rights within the territories of the member states. This 
is an international instrument that addresses relations between countries 
and promotes the desire “to reduce distortions and impediments to 
international trade, and taking into account the need to promote effective 
and adequate protection of intellectual property rights, and to ensure that 
measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do not 
themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.”70 The need for an 
international instrument that regulates this issue is more procedural than 
substantive. Certainly the drafters of the TRIPs Agreement did not intend 
to provide the member states with means to grant and protect intellectual 
property rights that would not eventually be enforced. Article 41 
specifically requires the TRIPs members to ensure that they can effectively 
take action against infringement of intellectual property rights under the 
scope of the agreement.71 Such actions include expeditious remedies to 
prevent and deter future infringement. The TRIPs Agreement does not 
limit itself to actions or judgments within the territory of each country. 
 
 
 69. BLAKENEY, supra note 27, at 123. 
 70. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 71. Article 41 of the TRIPs Agreement provides:  
Members shall ensure that enforcement procedures as specified in this Part are available 
under their law so as to permit effective action against any act of infringement of intellectual 
property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent 
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements. These 
procedures shall be applied in such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse. 
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The language of Articles 41 and 44 is very broad and seems to include acts 
of infringement of intellectual property rights and even if they originate in 
the enforcing country. In other words, an international obligation to 
recognize and enforce foreign judgments with respect to intellectual 
property rights is already in place and a new one does not need to be 
established. All we need is the procedural measures to implement it. 
A major question that we must pay attention to is whether these 
exceptions to the presumption of enforceability should be drafted in a 
broad or narrow manner. The purpose of this exercise is clear. Narrow 
exceptions allow the presumption to hold up in more cases than if it were 
the other way around, thus making it more difficult to overcome the 
presumption of enforceability and vice versa. 
The answer to this question depends in many ways on what exactly we 
want to achieve by adopting such a presumption, and what underlying 
policies we believe to be suitable. As previously discussed, there are many 
reasons for the growing need for an international instrument to regulate 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Arguably, if the goal is 
to make such an instrument as effective as possible, the best way would be 
to draft very narrow exceptions and limitations to the presumption. This 
enables as many judgments as possible to be recognized and enforced, and 
only in extreme situations would refusal to do so be justified. 
However, adopting such an approach may prove to be extremely 
dangerous. Countries have trepidations about entering into an international 
agreement that would force them to recognize and enforce foreign 
judgments, thus interfering with their sovereignty.72 This fear sometimes 
results from the unexpected. Each country has its own laws and legal 
traditions, and would oppose any attempt to coerce compliance with 
rulings of foreign courts.73 This fear is very hard to overcome and is 
probably another major reason for the failure of previous attempts to 
achieve this goal. These countries are aware of the advantages that such an 
instrument may provide their citizens, namely protection of their rights in 
foreign countries that are also members of the convention, but seem 
paralyzed by the possibility that other courts would interfere with their 
 
 
 72.  
The same idea underlies some of the literature on this topic, when asserting that the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments impinges on State sovereignty. In fact, it is 
not the recognition and enforcement themselves which cause the difficulty, but the fact that 
the court addressed implicitly recognises that the merits of the case were “better” adjudicated, 
in a procedural sense, by the court of origin, and hence that court was “more appropriate.” 
Kessedjian, supra note 21, at 9. 
 73. Id. 
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jurisdiction and sovereignty.74 Therefore, when they look at the 
equilibrium of “pros and cons” of joining such an instrument, they prefer 
sacrificing the advantages to avoid the disadvantages. The solution, 
therefore, would be to allow broad exceptions to the general presumption 
of enforceability and to enable member countries some discretion to avoid 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. Such a solution would 
make it easier for many countries to join the instrument despite their fears, 
because broad exceptions may serve as solace since they know that despite 
the fact that they undertook such an international obligation, they may still 
utilize the broad exceptions. After many countries join and sign the 
instrument and the system functions smoothly for several years, the trust 
among the participating countries is expected to grow. We can then try to 
gradually narrow these exceptions to enable the recognition and 
enforcement of even more judgments. This process will probably take 
many years and no one should expect a miracle solution as trust builds 
among sovereign nations, especially when interference with their 
sovereignty is involved. What is proposed is simply to plant the seeds for 
the future.  
D. Any Solution Should be Part of the Framework of the TRIPs Agreement 
There are several arguments to support the idea that an instrument 
which is limited in scope to intellectual property rights and drafted within 
the framework of the TRIPs Agreement is more likely to succeed, be 
adopted, and implemented, than a more general instrument. An example of 
a general instrument is the one negotiated at the Hague conference. The 
first to propose this idea were Professors Rochelle Dreyfuss and Jane 
Ginsburg.75 It seems that the benefits that a narrower instrument limited to 
 
 
 74. Interestingly, in the famous Hilton case, the U.S. Supreme Court starts its analysis of the 
doctrine of Comity used in that country to justify the enforcement of foreign judgments with the state 
sovereignty problem: “. . . No sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to execute within his 
dominions a judgment rendered by the tribunals of another State;” Hilton, 159 U.S. at 113. Others, on 
the other hand, have argued that it is a mistake to think that enforcement of a foreign judgment is a 
challenge to state sovereignty, since usually only private interests are involved. See Kessedjian, supra 
note 21, at 48.  
 75. See ROCHELLE C. DREYFUSS & JANE C. GINSBURG, DRAFT CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION 
AND RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MATTERS (Oct. 10, 2001), 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/ipp/intl-courts/docs/treaty10_10.pdf. Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg 
have suggested adopting a unique convention under the auspices of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) that would deal with the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments enforcing these rights. Such a convention would be more suitable to 
address all the delicate problems that are unique to intellectual property rights, and better defend the 
interests of the creative community.  
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intellectual property related judgments may offer exist both in the 
negotiations stage and in the implementation stage. First, a limited 
instrument will enable the negotiating parties to concentrate on the issues 
that are unique to intellectual property rights and thus conserve time and 
resources. This will also enable the parties to concentrate on substantive 
issues that are unique to intellectual property rights and their intangibility. 
A second reason to prefer an instrument limited to intellectual property 
is that such an approach will create synergies that may not be otherwise 
gained. Those countries that are currently Members of the TRIPs 
Agreement have already undertaken to protect intellectual property rights. 
Thus, it may be expected that they will have less objection to recognizing 
the need for protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights 
abroad. Furthermore, it would be possible to take advantage of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) infrastructure and institutions, 
and will also enable the international community to take advantage of 
certain features that can already be found within the TRIPs Agreement. 
For example, parties will be able to use the already existing requirements 
for due process of law that appear in Articles 41 and 42 of TRIPs, 
discussed later in detail, thus eliminating certain points of controversy. 
From an enforcement and implementation perspective, if a country is 
not fulfilling its obligations under the proposed convention, we can utilize 
the dispute resolution mechanism under TRIPs to make this country 
comply with its international obligations.76 This would also provide the 
participating parties with a certain degree of flexibility in making 
adjustments to the convention as needed.  
E. Procedural Requirements 
Before a judgment can be recognized or enforced by a foreign court, 
certain procedural conditions should be met. The purpose of these 
conditions is to convince the addressed court that the judgment at issue is 
indeed what it pertains to be, and that there are no other proceedings in the 
country where the judgment was rendered (or in another country) that can 
affect the enforcement proceedings. These procedural requirements are 
very common in such instruments and include proof of authenticity of the 
judgment, translation of the judgment to the local language in the 
enforcing jurisdiction and proof that the judgment has the effect of res 
judicata in the rendering forum and is now enforceable in that state 
 
 
 76. See id. at 2. 
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(namely that the judgment must be final and conclusive before it can be 
recognized).77  
F. Exceptions to the General Enforcement Rule 
One of the most important goals of this proposed solution is to make it 
attractive enough so that as many countries as possible would choose to 
become members of the convention. Naturally, the more countries that 
join, the more effective and useful the convention will be. It has been 
indicated above that many countries fear that by joining such an 
instrument they surrender elements of their sovereignty and independence 
and, therefore, will not become parties to such a proposed convention. In 
order to overcome this fear, it is proposed to provide very broad 
exceptions to the general presumption of enforceability previously 
discussed. By doing so, we are more likely to convince such hesitating 
countries that they can comfortably join the convention because if a need 
arises, they can find refuge by utilizing one of the broad exceptions 
provided therein to refuse the recognition or enforcement of the specific 
judgment. These broad exceptions provide a safe harbor that may 
eliminate, in the eyes of the hesitating countries, some of the risk 
associated with joining the convention and thus, allow them to undertake 
comfortably the international obligation while protecting their sovereignty 
and independence.  
1. The Due Process Exception 
One of the most significant arguments made against the recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments, especially by American scholars, is 
the one involving “due process” of law.78 The due process requirement is a 
fundamental pillar of the American legal system and an integral part of its 
Constitution.79 They argue that if courts in other countries around the 
world do not follow even the basic requirements and notions of due 
 
 
 77. The terms res judicata and autorite de chose jugee have the same meaning in common law 
and civil legal systems. See Nygh & Pocar, supra note 52, at 96; see also EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., 
CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1141 (3d ed. 2000); PETER BARNETT, RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS: THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 
(2001).  
 78. Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce, 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments (2002), available at http://www.osec.doc. 
gov/ogc/occic/refmj.htm (last visited July 16, 2007). 
 79. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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process of law, the judgments they provide are not worthy of being 
recognized and enforced.80  
One can argue, however, that this reason for refusing to recognize or 
enforce foreign judgments is not as convincing with respect to intellectual 
property judgments as it is perhaps with respect to other judgments. Two 
elements in the TRIPs Agreement are important to establish this argument. 
First, in order to be a Member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)81 and the WTO, every country must also sign the TRIPs 
Agreement. Indeed, many countries have signed TRIPs and undertook to 
abide by its provisions.82 As a result, many countries that do not 
necessarily have a strong interest in protecting intellectual property rights 
do so in order to enjoy other benefits they receive by remaining Members 
of GATT and the WTO. The second element of the argument is that 
countries that are members of the TRIPs Agreement, but neglect to 
comply with their international undertakings may be sanctioned for their 
behavior, i.e., “[t]rade sanctions may be collectively authorized to assure 
compliance by WTO Members with TRIPS obligations.”83 
Indeed, the TRIPs Agreement itself satisfies some of the basic 
requirements of due process of law and these requirements are inherent in, 
and an integral part of, this agreement. In fact, Part III of the TRIPs 
Agreement is dedicated to assuring the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights. The inclusion of the enforcement mechanism in the TRIPs 
Agreement is considered by many to be one of the most significant 
achievements of the TRIPs negotiations.84  
It is interesting to compare the requirements set forth in the landmark 
American decision of Hilton v. Guyot85 with respect to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments, with the general obligations that the 
Members of TRIPs undertook regarding the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights and more specifically Article 41(1).86 
 
 
 80. For example, in Remington Rand Corporation-Delaware v. Business Systems, Inc., 830 F.2d 
1260 (3d Cir. 1987), the court refused to recognize a decision rendered by a Dutch court since basic 
standards of due process of law were not met. 
 81. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 33 I.L.M. 1154 (1994). 
 82. “[T]he TRIPs Agreement was concluded as part of a Uruguay Round bargain which included 
the granting of concessions to developing countries in the field of agriculture and textiles, and the 
incorporation of transition periods in favor of developing countries in the TRIPs Agreement and other 
parts of the WTO Agreement text.” FREDERICK ABBOTT ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY SYSTEM: COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 339 (1999).  
 83. Id. at 359. 
 84. See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 197 
(London 1998). 
 85. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).  
 86. This Article does not limit itself to remedies after the infringement had taken place, but rather 
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 Opportunity for a Full and Fair Trial Abroad: 
The TRIPs Agreement requires that “[p]rocedures concerning the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair and equitable.”87 
This requirement provides that the proceedings may not be unreasonably 
complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time limits or unwarranted 
delays. The purpose of this Article is to ensure that when enforcement of 
intellectual property rights is involved, especially in cases involving non-
nationals as the main plaintiff, the procedures should not be more 
complicated than the customary procedures in the relevant country.88 The 
parties must have an opportunity to be heard and provide evidence to 
support their position, and the final judgment must be based on this 
evidence.89 Furthermore, the requirement for “fair and equitable 
procedures” includes the availability of civil judicial procedures.90 The 
merits of the case shall preferably be in writing, well reasoned, and 
available to the parties without undue delay.  
 Trial Before a Court of Competent Jurisdiction: 
Review under the TRIPs Agreement must be conducted by a “judicial 
authority of final administrative decisions and, subject to jurisdictional 
provisions in national laws concerning the importance of a case, of at least 
the legal aspects of initial judicial decisions on the merits of a case.”91  
 Trial Conducted Upon Regular Proceedings:  
There is no obligation on the Members of the TRIPs Agreement to “put 
in place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property 
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in general.”92 In other 
words, intellectual property litigation under TRIPs is the same as is 
 
 
also addresses the issue of prevention of intellectual property infringements, including expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringement. The availability of measures to prevent future infringements was a 
major concern of some for the Southeast Asian countries that did not have preventive injunctions in 
their legal systems. See Gervais, supra note 84, at 197.  
 87. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 41(2). This Article aims at assuring that procedures 
concerning the enforcement of intellectual property rights be fair and equitable and “[t]hey shall not be 
unnecessarily complicated or costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted delays.” Id. 
 88. See Gervais, supra note 84, at 198.  
 89. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 41(3). 
 90. See id. art. 42. 
 91. Id. art. 41(4). 
 92. Id. art. 41(5). 
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litigation of other issues, and it involves the regular legal proceedings 
provided by the laws of the relevant state.  
 Trial After Due Citation or Voluntary Appearance of the Defendant:  
The TRIPs Agreement goes into great detail to assure the parties the 
opportunity to appear before the relevant court and present their case. 
Defendants have a right to receive “written notice which is timely and 
contains sufficient detail, including the basis of the claims,”93 parties have 
the right to an independent counsel, and most importantly, these 
“procedures shall not impose overly burdensome requirements concerning 
mandatory personal appearances.”94 It is a prerequisite for the validity of 
these proceedings that the parties be offered an opportunity to be heard.95  
 Trial Under a System of Jurisprudence Likely to Secure an 
Impartial Administration of Justice Between the Citizens of Its Own 
Country and Those of Other Countries:  
This requirement is very easy to establish under TRIPs as it reflects the 
same idea as the National Treatment provision of this agreement, which is 
considered by many to be one of its cornerstones. It requires that “[e]ach 
Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less 
favorable than it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection 
of intellectual property,”96 subject to certain substantive exceptions. There 
is nothing in the TRIPs Agreement to support an argument that this 
requirement only applies to the substantive provisions of TRIPs and not to 
its procedural parts. Therefore, it can be inferred that in conducting civil 
legal proceedings regarding the protection of intellectual property rights, 
the rendering court is obligated to treat foreign nationals in the same 
manner that it treats its own. 
Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (the “Restatement”)97 provides that “[a] court in the United 
States may not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign state if the 
judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide 
 
 
 93. Id. art. 42.  
 94. Id.  
 95. See id. art. 41(3). 
 96. Id. art. 3. 
 97. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482 
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
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impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.”98 
The Restatement, however, does not exactly define what due process of 
law means in this context, and this is left for the interpretations of the 
various courts. The Restatement’s Official Comment does make a 
reference to the Hilton case as a potential source for such interpretation. In 
addition, “[e]vidence that the judiciary was dominated by the political 
branches of government or by an opposing litigant, or that a party was 
unable to obtain counsel, to secure documents or attendance of witnesses, 
or to have access to appeal or review, would support a conclusion that the 
legal system was one whose judgments are not entitled to recognition.”99 
This review illustrates the efforts of the drafters of the TRIPs 
Agreement to ensure that the notion of due process of law, similar to the 
way it is understood in the U.S., is followed and adopted by Members of 
the TRIPs Agreement, at least with respect to intellectual property rights. 
It should be noted that if this basic requirement is not followed by one of 
the Members of TRIPs, it risks that this issue be raised under the Dispute 
Settlement provisions of TRIPs100 by one of the other Members. This, of 
course, may result in the sanctioning of the violating Member. 
Arguably, if basic elements of due process of law, in its American 
form, already appear in the TRIPs Agreement and every member of the 
proposed recognition and enforcement convention must also be a Member 
of this agreement, the justification for the due process exception to the 
general enforcement rule is significantly reduced, and recognition and 
enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments would arguably be 
substantially easier because the rendering court is already required to 
provide these minimum standards of due process.101 
However, one must remember that TRIPs is a public international 
agreement between countries and therefore allegedly has no direct 
influence on private persons. As a result, the fact that the rendering 
jurisdiction may be sanctioned under international law for not assuring due 
process of law and not complying with its international obligations does 
not help the person who eventually suffered from this lack of compliance. 
Therefore, there is still a need for the proposed convention to include a due 
process of law exception so that a judge in the enforcing jurisdiction can 
protect the rights of the defendant without having to wait for the wheels of 
international law to turn. In other words, such an exception in the 
 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 97, § 482 cmt. 
 100. TRIPs Agreement, Part V (arts. 63–64).  
 101. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 202–03. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 339 Oestreicher book pages.doc 10/12/2007  
 
 
 
 
 
366 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 6:339 
 
 
 
 
proposed convention is still needed, but it is expected that it will be rarely 
used in light of the due process obligations already provided in the TRIPs 
Agreement. 
2. Fraud 
Another recognized ground for refusal by courts to recognize or 
enforce foreign judgments relates to fraud by the winning party in 
obtaining the judgment. Long ago it was established in England and the 
U.S.102 that a judgment obtained by fraud may be denied recognition and 
enforcement in the second addressed forum.103 One major question that 
remains unanswered is the exact meaning of the term “fraud” in this 
context. 
There are at least four types of possible frauds that can be 
differentiated: (1) fraud as to the jurisdiction of the court of origin; (2) 
fraud in relation to the applicable law; (3) fraud concerning prior 
notification to the defendant in the original proceeding; and (4) fraud 
committed in the submission of evidence to the court of origin.104 
While there are examples of all these types of fraud, the example below 
is based on the fourth type of fraud committed with regard to submission 
of evidence to the court of origin. Under Article 4 of the Paris Convention, 
participating countries are expected to recognize the right of priority with 
regards to patents.105 Thus, if one managed to apply for a patent in 
Country A, that person could use the same filing date in order to register 
the same patent in Contracting State B, although someone else tried to 
register a similar patent in Country B in the period between the two filing 
dates. Assume a situation where defendant tries to register a patent in 
Country B and later realizes that based on the right of priority, plaintiff 
registered the same patent using an earlier date of registration in Country 
A. The two parties become involved in legal litigation in Country B over 
the right for the patent, and the plaintiff wins. In order to succeed in a law 
suit in Country B, plaintiff introduces a forged certificate of registration, 
 
 
 102. See Hilton, 159 U.S. 113 (holding that a court could refuse to enforce a judgment if it was 
procured by fraud). 
 103. In the U.S., there is a difference between intrinsic fraud and extrinsic fraud. Intrinsic fraud 
relates to the actual proceedings that took place in the rendering court, such as forged documents that 
were presented and perjury. Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, deals with the rendering court’s 
jurisdiction and not with the actual proceedings (e.g., lack of opportunity to present the case due to 
false misrepresentations). SCOLES ET AL., supra note 77, at 1169. 
 104. Kessedjian, supra note 13, at 23. 
 105. Paris Covention, art. 4. 
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according to which plaintiff registered the same patent in Country A, a few 
days before the defendant registered the patent in Country B, thus trying to 
take advantage of the right of priority and win the patent in Country B as 
well. Based on this decision, the court also awards the plaintiff 
compensatory damages for patent infringement. Defendant is a resident of 
Country C and all of defendant’s assets are located within this territory. If 
a court in Country C is asked to enforce a judgment relating to the above-
mentioned patent in favor of the plaintiff, it may refuse to do so because 
the judgment was obtained by fraud and the plaintiff that claimed the 
patent, never had a legitimate right to receive it.  
Section 482 of the Restatement, previously mentioned, also provides 
for a fraud exception. However, the Comment to this section makes a 
distinction between “intrinsic” fraud106 and “extrinsic” fraud.107 It is 
argued there that intrinsic fraud should not normally defeat recognition of 
the judgment of the foreign court, because these are allegedly matters that 
could be addressed by the rendering court. The purpose of this intrinsic 
fraud rule was to prevent reconsideration of disputed evidence by the 
enforcing court. It has been proposed by the Restatement that “[i]f the 
judgment could be set aside in the rendering state, the court in the United 
States where enforcement is sought should stay the action for enforcement 
in order to give the judgment debtor a reasonable opportunity to petition 
the rendering court to set the judgment aside, subject, in appropriate cases, 
to the giving of security.”108 This, however, was not the approach taken by 
the drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, who refused to 
make such a distinction.109 
The approach taken by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, which 
ignores the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud, is arguably, 
the preferable one, and any future international convention containing a 
fraud exception should be interpreted broadly to contain both kinds of 
fraud. When justice is the goal, there is no room for such a distinction. 
After all, it is usually the winning party who engaged in the suspicious 
activities that resulted in the fraud, and there is no justification to reward 
such party by requiring the other party to incur additional expenses and 
initiate further proceedings in the rendering forum to set the judgment 
 
 
 106. For example “that the judgment was based on perjured testimony or falsified documents.” 
Restatement, supra note 97, § 482 cmt. 
 107. For example, “fraudulent action by the prevailing party that deprived the losing party of 
adequate opportunity to present its case to the court.” Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 68, 70 (1980). 
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aside. While it is true that the enforcing court is not and should not be 
sitting as an appellate court on the decisions of the rendering court, this is 
not the issue in this case because when it comes to intrinsic fraud, the 
rendering court was in many cases unaware of the circumstances involving 
the fraud at the time the judgment was rendered, so the enforcing court is 
not really second-guessing its decision on this point. Furthermore, one 
must keep in mind that for various reasons the losing party cannot always 
return to the rendering jurisdiction to request the setting aside of the 
judgment.110 
Most international instruments addressing recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgments contain a fraud exception to the general rule of 
enforcement,111 and so should any future convention.  
3. Public Policy 
Probably the most important exception to the presumption of 
enforceability is that involving public policy. “This provision is 
traditionally found in all national laws and in all the international 
conventions, whether bilateral or multilateral.”112 There seems to be a 
consensus on the need for a public policy exception.113 The exact meaning 
of the term “public policy” or “ordre public,” as it is known in several 
countries, is not entirely clear. Once again, the case law in this field is not 
uniform, and different opinions have been introduced.114 In order to 
determine whether it is justified to refuse recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, courts are using different tests. For example, in the 
U.S. “[t]he public policy exception operates only in those unusual cases 
where the foreign judgment is ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what 
 
 
 110. This can happen for various reasons such as the replacement of the political regime in the 
rendering jurisdiction, or fear of legal steps that are likely to be initiated against such party if it were to 
enter the rendering jurisdiction.  
 111. For example, Article 25(1)(e) of the Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal provides that “[r]ecognition 
or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if . . . the judgment was obtained by fraud in connection 
with a matter of procedure.” See also 2004 Hague Draft, art. 28(1)(e).  
 112. Kessedjian, supra note 13, at 21. See also INTERNATIONAL JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS 
PROJECT—REPORT, A.L.I. 26 (Apr. 14, 2000). 
 113. See Brussels Convention, art. 50; 1971 Hague Convention, art. 5(1); Proposed Hague Draft, 
art. 28(1). See also New York Convention, art. V(2)(b) (holding that “[r]ecognition and enforcement 
of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country where recognition 
and enforcement is sought finds that: . . . the recognition or enforcement of the award would be 
contrary to the public policy of that country”). 
 114. See Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir. 1956). See also 
RESTATEMENT § 482. 
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is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought,’”115 or when 
the judgment “‘tends clearly’ to undermine the public interest, the public 
confidence in the administration of the law, or security for individual 
rights of personal liberty or of private property.”116 Thus, it is highly 
unlikely that an American court would agree to assert its jurisdiction over 
a foreign entity that has a branch in a U.S. territory, if it would be asked to 
determine the rights of this entity to intellectual property in its home 
country.117 
It was then-Judge Cardozo who defined public policy as “some deep-
rooted tradition of the common weal.”118 The Restatement also addresses 
this issue in Section 482 by providing for an exception to the general rule 
of enforcement if “the cause of action on which the judgment was based, 
or the judgment itself, is repugnant to the public policy of the United 
States or of the State where recognition is sought.” The Comment to this 
Section defines public policy as “fundamental notions of decency and 
justice.” 
Along these lines, the American Law Institute is drafting its version of 
the public policy exception in its recent enforcement project. This 
definition is extremely important when one is dealing with substantively 
un-harmonized intellectual property regimes. Under this very narrow 
definition, “[t]he fact that the judgment in question is based on a cause of 
action not known (or previously abolished) in the United States should not 
lead to denial of enforcement.”119  
Even more important is the fact that different countries have different 
ideas as to what this term means, and that what is considered to be a public 
policy in one country is not necessarily a public policy in another.120 To a 
certain extent, the public policy exception is a protection mechanism that 
provides countries with the ability to protect the very basic ideas and 
principles that guide them. Generally, the public interests at issue in 
 
 
 115. McCord v. Jet Spray Int’l Corp., 874 F. Supp. 436 (D.Mass. 1994) (enforcing a Belgian 
judgment as a matter of law and awarding damages to an employee for breach of an employment 
contract because it was not repugnant to the public policy of Massachusetts, despite the differences 
between Belgian and Massachusetts law on this point). See also Restatement, supra note 97, § 482. 
 116. Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (partially enforcing a foreign default 
judgment rendered by a West German court). 
 117. See Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 633. 
 118. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111 (1918). In this case, the question was whether 
a right of action under a Massachusetts statute might be enforced by New York courts. 
 119. The American Law Institute, supra note 112, at 27. 
 120. For example, some countries prohibit prostitution and the use of drugs, while others view 
such activities as legal and allowed. Another even more relevant example is that the United States 
recognizes awards of punitive damages, while most other countries do not. See the discussion of 
punitive damages, supra note 14.  
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intellectual property cases are the protection of the public domain and 
incentives to creativity. For example, the Preamble to the TRIPs 
Agreement recognizes “the underlying public policy objectives of national 
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including 
developmental and technological objectives.”121 In cases where intellectual 
property rights are involved, the question is whether a nation could or 
should be allowed to have idiosyncratic notions (e.g., about the First 
Amendment) about the public domain, and the protection of intellectual 
property.122  
One can argue, however, that there are other public policies involved 
that courts should, and are, allowed to take into consideration. For 
example, the TRIPs Agreement recognizes in Article 31 the concept of 
compulsory licenses in cases of “a national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency.”123 Similarly, Article 27 allows TRIPs 
Members to exclude inventions from patentability when it is necessary to 
protect public order, or morality, including protection of human, animal, 
or plant life or health. As a result, in certain situations there may be 
conflicting public policies that can influence the decision of whether to 
recognize or enforce the foreign intellectual property judgment. Since each 
country is different from the others, there is no wonder that the public 
policies guiding them vary as well. 
This vagueness in determining what public policy means creates 
numerous problems. One may even argue that the term has an inherent 
conflict. This term exists in the international sphere as it appears in 
international instruments and aims at providing countries with a 
mechanism that will enable them to refrain from recognizing and 
enforcing foreign judgments, even though all other requirements were met. 
On the other hand, the determination of what exactly constitutes public 
policy is done not in the international sphere, but rather in the national 
sphere, namely by national courts. This means that international law 
provides a mechanism that can be only interpreted by national laws and 
courts. Hence, it is assumed that French public policy is different from 
British public policy, which is different from American public policy, and 
we accept this notion. 
The most complicated question with respect to public policy is how far 
this concept should be stretched to regulate activities taking place outside 
 
 
 121. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl. 
 122. See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 
(N.D. Ca. 2001). 
 123. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31. 
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the geographical and political borders of the recognizing or enforcing 
jurisdiction. With the changes in technology and the fading of borders, this 
is expected to become a fundamental question. A distinction needs to be 
made between the application of the public policy exception to recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments in cases where the behavior to be 
regulated takes place outside the borders of the enforcing jurisdiction, and 
those cases in which the regulated behavior is to take place inside the 
borders of the enforcing jurisdiction. Extraterritorial application of the 
public policy exception should be viewed very suspiciously because it 
increases tensions between the relevant jurisdictions. Despite the fading of 
political and geographical borders, there is still a very strong sense of self-
government and control among countries. Therefore, outside interference 
will not be viewed favorably, and will result in achieving the exact 
opposite of what we initially wanted to achieve, namely, recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  
During the negotiations at the Hague Conference, the words 
“manifestly incompatible” with public policy have been used.124 This 
allegedly means that the right to refuse to enforce or recognize foreign 
judgments should be carefully and seldom used, and only in extreme 
situations.125 Arguably, it does not mean that simply because the court 
rendering the first judgment applied a law that is substantively different 
from the one that the court addressed would have applied in a certain set of 
facts, had the case been brought to its review, or because the rendering 
court made a mistake regarding the facts of the case or the law (unless 
induced by fraud), the addressed court can refuse recognition or 
enforcement.126 
In light of the above analysis, one might ask whether it is time to 
finally abandon the public policy mechanism in international instruments. 
The writer believes that the answer is no. This negative answer is not 
because this mechanism is so good, but rather because we have yet to 
come up with an adequate substitution that would fill the current function 
that the public policy mechanism fills. Arguably, automatic recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgments is unreasonable and will not work 
now or probably ever. Each country is unique and has its own agenda in 
the sense that it protects those values and policies that are most important 
to its development and citizens. Therefore, as long as there is no 
 
 
 124. New Hague Convention, art. 9(e). 
 125. “This indicates that the weapon of refusal must be rarely invoked and only as a last resort.” 
Nygh & Pocar, supra note 52, at 114.  
 126. See Nygh & Pocar, supra note 52, at 108. 
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substitution for the public policy mechanism in international law, we will 
have to preserve it. 
One may argue that the use of the public policy exception to 
international recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments should be 
extremely narrow. This exception should be rarely used by enforcing 
courts and limited to extreme situations in which no other solution is 
available. It would not be unreasonable to argue that as long as the 
minimum standards of the TRIPs Agreement are complied with, the 
potential need to refuse to recognize and enforce foreign judgments is 
reduced. A world with better business relations and better exchange of 
commodities and products requires an established and reliable system for 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; overuse of the public 
policy exception would result in interference with the elements of 
predictability and certainty.  
On the other hand, one may criticize this argument by saying that even 
if the minimum standards are met, there are still certain situations in which 
public policies should be used to justify such a refusal for recognition or 
enforcement of a foreign judgment. This is probably true, but only to a 
limited extent. The TRIPs Agreement itself provides means to address 
such situations and therefore, solutions should be almost always limited to 
those already provided by TRIPs. These means include, for example, the 
compulsory license provisions of TRIPs,127 which enable countries, in 
particular situations and subject to certain conditions, to utilize foreign 
patents to achieve certain goals. This means that the drafters of TRIPs 
were aware of the possibility of certain situations in which compliance 
with the minimum standards would be difficult to accomplish and, 
therefore, provided means to cope with this difficulty within the 
boundaries of this agreement. When faced with such a problem, the 
recognizing court must look for a solution inside the international 
obligations of TRIPs, and turn to the public policy exception only as a last 
resort. 
In the preamble to the TRIPs Agreement, the participating States 
declare that one of their reasons for joining TRIPs is because they are 
“[r]ecognizing the underlying public policy objectives of national systems 
for the protection of intellectual property, including developmental and 
technological objectives.”128 This language establishes that the TRIPs 
Agreement itself already takes into consideration the underlying public 
 
 
 127. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 31. 
 128. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, pmbl.  
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policies with respect to intellectual property rights, at least those that are 
within the scope of this agreement. Therefore, there is arguably no need 
for the public policy exception as long as the judgment complies with the 
provisions of TRIPs.  
What, then are the underlying public policies referred to in the 
preamble to TRIPs? Professor Michael Blakeney believes that an answer 
may be found in Article 7 of TRIPs, which addresses its objectives129 and 
provides that these include “the promotion of technological innovation and 
. . . the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage 
of producers and users of technical knowledge . . . in a manner conducive 
to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and 
obligations.”130 In addition, Article 8 of TRIPs amplifies the objectives 
referred to in the Preamble and permits Members of TRIPs to “adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote 
the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic 
and technological development.”131 
To many, the complete abandonment of the public policy exception 
may sound unrealistic and imaginary in the sense that there is always a 
need for such an exception when recognition and enforcement of foreign 
judgments is involved.132 It is hard to imagine that any international 
instrument for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment 
addressing intellectual property rights can be adopted, or has any potential 
of being adopted and implemented, without containing a public policy 
exception. Logically, in order to ensure the free flow of judgments a 
narrow public policy exception should have sufficed.133 Nevertheless, it 
seems that at least at the initial stage, it would be more efficient and 
appealing to adopt broad grounds for refusal to recognize or enforce 
foreign judgments as this would enable more countries to join such an 
international instrument knowing that they always have the option to 
refuse to do so, if a need should arise in the future. A broad public policy 
exception, even though, to a great extent, not recommended and 
unjustified, would serve as a safe harbor and an incentive to attract as 
many countries as possible to join. At a later stage, once the proposed 
convention is successfully implemented, confidence in the system grows 
 
 
 129. See BLAKENEY, supra note 27, at 42. 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. at 43. 
 132. Indeed, all the regional conventions currently in effect, as well as past proposals to regulate 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments contain a “public policy” exception. For review 
of analysis of these instruments, see Oestreicher, supra note 6, at 125–79.  
 133. See Blumer, supra note 67, at 399. 
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and relevant case law develops, hopefully it would be possible to try and 
convince these countries to narrow this exception for the sake of certainty, 
predictability and free trade. 
4. Parallel Litigation 
Another widely recognized and accepted reason for refusing to 
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment involves the issue of parallel 
litigation. It is not uncommon for adverse parties to engage in several 
parallel proceedings in different courts and forums that involve the very 
same set of facts and dispute.134  
It is well accepted within the international community that in such 
situations, the addressed court has a legitimate reason to refuse the 
recognition or enforcement of the foreign judgment,135 if proceedings 
between the same parties, based on the same facts and having the same 
purpose: “a) are pending before a court of the State addressed and those 
proceedings were the first to be instituted, or b) have resulted in a decision 
by a court of the State addressed, or c) have resulted in a decision by a 
court of another State which would be entitled to recognition and 
enforcement under the law of the State addressed.”136 
5. Lack of Jurisdiction—Minimum Contacts 
As previously discussed in detail, the central element in the proposed 
convention is the attempt to avoid addressing the issue of jurisdiction at 
the stage of negotiations and eliminate the need to agree in advance on 
bases for the assertion of jurisdiction, such as with double or mixed model 
based conventions. In other words, it is for the opposing party to convince 
the court addressed that the rendering court should not have rendered the 
judgment, and thus that the judgment should not be recognized or enforced 
under one of the exceptions to the presumption. 
There may be, however, certain scenarios in which we must grant the 
enforcing court a mechanism to avoid recognizing or enforcing the 
judgment. These are cases in which there is a so-called “red flag” waving 
over the judgment indicating that there was not even a minimum contact 
 
 
 134. This doctrine is recognized as lis alibi pendens. For more on this doctrine see Martine 
Stuckelberg, Lis Pendens and Forum Non Conveniens at the Hague Conference, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L. 
L. 949 (2001). 
 135. See, e.g., 2004 Hague Draft, art. 28(1). 
 136. 1971 Hague Convention art. 5. See also Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal art. 25, and 2004 Hague 
Draft, art. 28(1).  
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between the rendering court and the parties or the dispute, such that the 
rendering court had no right to grant the judgment. This exception may be 
used only in situations in which it is obvious that the rendering court 
should not have heard the case. If the judgment survived the proposed “red 
flag” test, but there may have been a more suitable jurisdiction to hear the 
case, the judgment should still be recognized or enforced, as long as the 
minimum contacts between the rendering jurisdiction and the parties or the 
dispute are met. 
The reason for using this test only in extreme situations is the fact that 
all the member countries of such a convention are expected to be Members 
of the TRIPs Agreement, under which they are required to adhere to the 
same minimum standards for protection of intellectual property rights, 
thus avoiding any significant substantive gaps in the provision of 
protection, which will only be narrowed as time passes.  
One may argue that such an approach will result in “forum shopping.” 
This is true, but only to a limited extent. Forum shopping can be exercised 
in such a case, but adjudication of the dispute must take place in a forum 
with at least minimum contacts with the parties or the dispute. Since all 
potential forums must provide the minimum protection required by the 
TRIPs Agreement, the devil is not as scary as it may initially look. 
Furthermore, forum shopping is not that big of a problem when it comes to 
intellectual property rights, especially in light of the fact that it happens 
daily in legal practice all around the world, including in the U.S.137 
G. Enforcement in Proximity as a Potential Solution 
Another set of problems arises when the remedy ordered by the 
rendering court does not exist under the laws of the country in which 
recognition or enforcement is sought. For example, some countries 
provide for injunctive relief, while others do not.138 This problem might be 
solved if we enable the addressed court that is asked to enforce a remedy 
which is nonexistent in its legal system to use its discretion and replace 
such remedy with one that exists under its legal system and is most likely 
to achieve the result intended by the rendering court. In the injunctive 
relief example, the simplest solution would obviously be to replace the 
 
 
 137. “Where two or more jurisdictions are able to hear a dispute, a plaintiff can “forum shop,” or 
choose among alternative fora, often with an opportunity to pre-empt a defendant’s choice.” Kimberly 
A. Moore & Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Forum Shopping in Cyberspace, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1325, 1328 (2002). 
 138. See TRIPs Agreement, art. 44(2). 
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injunctive relief with a monetary award. Such monetary award may be 
viewed as “enforcement in proximity,”139 and was in fact part of the 
solution offered by Professors Dreyfuss and Ginsburg in their proposal.140 
The main problem with this idea is that injunctive relief is usually 
considered an equitable relief that is traditionally available in those cases 
where remedies at law, such as monetary damages, are simply 
inappropriate or inadequate.141 In the American legal system, equitable 
remedies are unavailable if monetary relief can be used to compensate the 
plaintiff for damages suffered.142 Therefore, this proposed solution may 
really not solve anything, because if monetary relief would have been 
available, it would have been awarded from the beginning. Furthermore, 
we still need to resolve cases where monetary judgments would be 
ineffective.  
The TRIPs Agreement addresses this very issue. In Article 44(2) it 
allows its Members, in cases where injunctions are inconsistent with 
national law, to provide “declaratory judgments and adequate 
compensation.”143 It is clear that this provision aims at solving the 
problem of differences in remedies between national laws, recognizing 
that they are not necessarily identical. Therefore, the TRIPs Agreement 
allows its Member States to provide other remedies to substitute for those 
that are unavailable. These provisions should be expanded and applied in 
cases where an addressed court is asked to recognize or enforce a foreign 
judgment containing a remedy not available in its jurisdiction and enable 
the court to substitute this remedy with another one.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article introduces a solution to the problem of recognition and 
enforcement of foreign intellectual property judgments that is based on a 
simple convention that includes a presumption of enforceability and a 
limited number of broadly defined exceptions to this presumption. 
 
 
 139. “Enforcement in Proximity” means that the court addressed attempts to replace the remedy 
provided by the rendering court with a remedy available in the enforcing jurisdiction, which to the 
extent possible, accomplishes the same goal.  
 140. See Dreyfuss-Ginsburg Proposal, art. 31(C).  
 141. For the four-factor test regarding the award of a permanent injunction in the U.S., see
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006); Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 
2d 440, 442 (D. Del. 2007) 
 142. Id. 
 143. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 9, art. 44(2). 
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One may argue that the breadth of these exceptions threaten the very 
existence of the presumption in a way that, after considering these 
exceptions, there is not much left of the presumption. This argument is 
only partly true and it does not change the benefits that such a solution 
provides. What we will be left with after the alleged erosion of the 
presumption of enforceability is still much more than what we have today 
without it. The real question is not whether this proposed solution is a 
perfect one. It is clearly not. Rather, the question should be, what exactly 
is the goal that we are trying to achieve? If indeed we think that 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments generates benefits to 
society and international trade, every step in that direction, even a small 
step such as the one proposed here, is by far better than what we have 
today—namely, nothing. 
The absence of an international instrument regulating this issue has 
consequences that many scholars have attempted to overcome. Since most 
previous attempts to solve these problems were extremely ambitious in 
their scope and coverage144 and therefore failed, maybe it is time to move 
more slowly and gradually in this direction. This minimalist proposal 
should be viewed more as the laying of foundations and a first step on a 
very long journey, than a full-blown comprehensive solution to the 
problem. It is not that we would not be better off with a solution that 
promotes narrow exceptions to the presumption. In a perfect world such a 
solution would probably benefit us more; however, ours is not a perfect 
world. If we want to make any progress in this direction, we should do it 
very slowly and carefully, hoping that time will cure any current mistrust 
and suspicion so that we can gradually narrow these exceptions.  
Based on recent history and the failure of previous attempts to solve 
these problems, the only alternative would be to give up and leave the 
situation as is. This would continue to suppress present and emerging 
business relations that depend on trust and stability for survival.  
 
 
 144. See Oestreicher, supra note 6, at 125–79. 
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